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█ Abstract In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort 
out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwith-
standing, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that charac-
terize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspec-
tion and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology. 
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█ Riassunto I primitivi della coscienza e la loro realtà – In The Varieties of Consciousness Kriegel sostiene la 
possibilità di concepire un metodo per mettere ordine tra le esperienze fenomenicamente primitive effet-
tivamente esistenti, ciascuna nella propria irriducibilità rispetto alle altre. In questo testo intendo sostene-
re che, nonostante la sua neutralità, Kriegel assume una forma di realismo che lascia aperti molti dei pro-
blemi che caratterizzano il dibattito sulla coscienza. Questi problemi diventano evidenti sia nella centrali-
tà assegnata all’introspezione sia nella caratterizzazione specifica della fenomenologia cognitiva. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Coscienza; Introspezione; Realismo; Identità di tipo; Proprietà disposizionali 
 

 
 PHILOSOPHY IS FREQUENTLY CONSIDERED, 
by the lay person, as the domain of vague and 
foggy discussions. Consciousness, even among 
some philosophers, is considered to be the 
topic in which vagueness and metaphorical 
jargon prevails. So, consciousness is, in many 
respects, the fuzziest of intellectual activities. 
In The Varieties of Consciousness, Uriah 
Kriegel faces this problem head-on, devising a 
number of specific and detailed arguments 
and strategies for making the topic of con-
sciousness less vague and demonstrates that it 
is a topic we should care about or, at least, 
have explicit reasons to care about.  
The fundamental question of this book is to 
understand how many types of primitive phe-
nomenology exist. By primitive phenomenolo-
gy, Kriegel means types of experiences, that is, 
those internal happenings that guide, justify 
and promote our sensory, cognitive or intellec-
tual life. Interestingly, he has a definitive and 
precise answer: there are six fundamental phe-
nomenological types. Before getting into this, 
though, it is worthwhile understanding the 
general structure Kriegel has in mind. 
The metaphysical realm of phenomenology 
and consciousness, according to Kriegel, is or-
ganized along a fundamental relation, the de-
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terminable/determinate one. This is the order-
ing relation that holds between items when 
these items are sorted using dependency rela-
tions. Consider colored items and red items. If 
something is colored, it is still undetermined 
what color it may be. If it is red, it is possible to 
more precisely determine its color. But there 
are many shades of red, of course.  
So red is still determinable with respect 
to, say, crimson, and crimson is still determi-
nable with respect to, say, crimson14 as op-
posed to crimson15, if we imagine that these 
numbers refer to some observer independent 
classification, perhaps one based on the spec-
troscopy of light reflection. So, the property 
of being colored opens a determinable / de-
terminate relation that ends with individual 
colored entities of specific shades, which we 
may call the infimic determinates (see Ellis’ 
Scientific Realism1 for this view), that admit 
no further determination.  
The relation of determination is to be dis-
tinguished from a similar relation, that be-
tween species and genus. For instance, in the 
genus (genre) of visual experiences you can 
have experiences of shapes and experiences 
of colors, and these do not compete with 
each other, in the sense that you can change 
colors while preserving shape or change 
shape while preserving color. So, in the genus 
perception there are at least two species, 
shape perceptions and color perceptions, 
which coexist in space and time. Vice versa, if 
you confront yourself with two colors, you 
cannot have them both in the same spot at 
the same time: same level determinates com-
pete as qualities for a given entity, same level 
species do not necessarily do so. 
Back to the original question: are there 
different types of phenomenal experience? 
The first move is to devise a method for an-
swering this question, and Kriegel proposes 
the following (after a number of revisions 
and expansions): 
 
(1) introspective noticing of apparent 
phenomenal similarities; (2) abductive in-
ference from said similarities to putative 
phenomenal universals; (3) ordering of 
said universals into layers of phenomenal 
determinables; (4) identifying the phe-
nomenal primitives in each layer of de-
terminables; (5) identifying the phenom-
enal derivatives in each layer. The result is 
a web of phenomenal universals bearing 
grounding and determinability relations.2  
 
It is at the end of the application of this 
method, which basically takes up the whole 
book, that the answer is provided: the most de-
terminable layer is phenomenology per se, the 
very fact that there is an inner sense and an in-
ner life that plays a fundamental role in our 
overall life experience. As such, phenomenolo-
gy per se assumes different modes, and these 
compose the second determinable layer, the 
one that individuates all and only those types of 
phenomenology that are not the result of the 
interrelation of other phenomenologies.  
These are: perceptual, algedonic (the 
phenomenology of pain and pleasure), cogni-
tive (judging to be true), conative (deciding 
and acting rather than desiring), entertaining 
(that is, considering a proposition without 
taking a stance on it), imagining. Emotional 
and moral phenomenologies are taken to be 
the by-products of the other phenomenolo-
gies, variously combined.  
Curiously, to my epistemological taste, 
Kriegel considers the problem of analyzing 
whether a given phenomenology can be dis-
solved in terms of other phenomenologies as a 
form of reduction. Reduction becomes, in a sen-
se, an enterprise that applies to phenomenolo-
gies of the same layer, with no ontological twist. 
So, for instance, in arguing that emotional 
phenomenology is the result of combining oth-
er types of phenomenologies, Kriegel is com-
mitted to saying that there are no primitive 
emotional experiences, and that, say, being 
scared is not a specific and not further analyza-
ble kind of experience. I will not discuss this in-
teresting point further for reasons of space. 
The first problem I want to pose is the 
commitment to realism that is behind 
Kriegel’s work.  
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█  Realism 
 
Kriegel affirms that he doesn’t take sides on 
the realist versus anti-realist debate over the 
nature of phenomenal states. Even if he seems 
to be inclined towards realism – «the most de-
sirable view in this area is robust realism about 
phenomenal similarity, determinability, and 
grounding alike» – he declares that he prefers 
to «stay neutral on this issue».3  
Clearly, Kriegel’s attitude is a realist one, 
which is welcome by my standards, but the 
way he builds his argument presents the risk 
of overlooking many conundrums that are at 
the heart of the debate on consciousness. 
Let’s start with a note that is apparently mar-
ginal. Kriegel insists that conscious phenom-
ena are introspectively observable.4 “Observ-
able” is a dispositional term, one that says 
that in some condition C a subject S intro-
spects phenomenon P. This is the so-called 
simple conditional analysis of what disposi-
tional terms amount to, and opens up a 
plethora of problems. For, if you are a realist 
about dispositions, then entities that have 
dispositional properties, have such properties 
even when they are not instantiated.  
This means that if an entity is observable, 
then it is so even if no one observes it. But, in 
the case of phenomenal or conscious phe-
nomena, this seems puzzling. For, how is it 
possible that a conscious phenomenon is 
there to be observed even when I do not at-
tend to or “encounter” (as Kriegel says) it?  
Being elements or, as I prefer to say, crea-
tures of the mind, conscious phenomena are 
not free-floating entities, ready to be grasped 
by me or you on occasion. It seems that we 
cannot invoke a third platonic realm, the one 
invoked by Frege for locating meanings, to 
deposit phenomenal experiences. From a 
strictly phenomenal view, conscious phenom-
ena compose my consciousness, in that there is 
nothing to my consciousness which is not in 
its stream. And this stream is a collection, ger-
rymandered and serendipitous as you wish, of 
these conscious phenomena, which are born, 
live and die once they are gone.  
Sure, I can have memories of them, but a 
memory of a conscious phenomenon is differ-
ent from a conscious phenomenon, as Kriegel 
is well aware, this being part of his distinction 
between “introspection proper” and “intro-
spection loosely called”. But Kriegel, as it turns 
out later in the book, thinks that phenomenal 
properties are categorical properties, that is, 
properties that are independent from the 
functional roles they may play and, according 
to many, to be contrasted with dispositional 
properties. So, calling phenomenal properties 
“observables” raises some problems with re-
spect to the correct interpretation of these 
properties (is Kriegel defending a dual aspect 
view of properties as Heil5 does?) 
The importance of this point is fully illu-
minated once one considers the role it has 
played in the debate over the type-identity 
theory of the mind. During the 50s, Smart, 
Armstrong and Place argued that types of 
mental states, and they were referring to 
“pain states”, that is algedonic-conscious 
phenomena, are identical to types of physical 
states. This theory was abandoned after 
Kripke6 forcefully argued, using a different 
terminology but with I think the same gist, 
that conscious properties are token-reflexive 
properties. His point was that being in pain is 
feeling pain, and we cannot imagine someone 
having a certain phenomenal condition while 
not feeling it. At the same time, Kripke ar-
gued, it is possible for someone to undergo a 
certain conscious phenomenon without be-
ing in the physical state type isolated by some 
corresponding neural state. All this applies to 
the debate at hand in the following way. 
The first is the one just mentioned: real-
ism about conscious phenomena has to be 
construed as a sui generis realism, because the 
nature of these phenomena cannot be ob-
server-independent: they exhaust themselves 
in being present to an observer. It is true that, 
when it comes to pain and pleasure, we try to 
avoid or seek them, but what we do is act by 
virtue of our, more or less, faded memories, 
not because of pain or pleasure in them-
selves. So, the functional role of pain is not 
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the role that determines what pain amounts 
to, prima facie contrary to the dispositional 
view. The categorical interpretation of these 
properties, then, takes their role to be inde-
pendent of them.  
However, being an immediate object of 
acquaintance is an essential role of these 
properties. That is, a property is phenomenal 
if and only if it is an immediate object of ac-
quaintance. In describing phenomenality and 
introspection as distinct moments in our 
conscious life, Kriegel takes apart the core of 
the categorical view of phenomenal proper-
ties, the very coincidence of these two mo-
ments, a coincidence neglected by the identi-
ty theorists and criticized by Kripke. There-
fore, his oscillation between a dispositional 
and a categorical view of properties remains 
as problematic. 
A second and related problem is how to 
assess the robustness of introspection as a 
method to identify the phenomenal primi-
tives belonging to the second layer. One may 
want to make sense of the idea that there is a 
way to settle whether two conscious phe-
nomena are similar or whether one can be 
reduced to the other. The point is whether 
phenomenal similarity is introspection inde-
pendent or not. Here the discussion over the 
type identity theory comes in handy again. 
Because, the type identity theorist was com-
mitted to the idea that phenomenal similarity 
is not dependent solely on introspection, in 
that there are objective facts regarding our 
conscious phenomena that allow for com-
plete identification through equally objective 
physical phenomena. But that theory was 
discarded by the defenders of the non-
reducibility of conscious phenomena.  
In admitting the possibility of comparing, 
to settle the question of their similarity, two 
conscious phenomena, you being the subject 
of only one phenomenon at time, we are ad-
mitting that phenomenal entities are free-
floating independently of our introspections. 
But how can this be?  
Such a comparison is a metaphysical ab-
straction that goes beyond what real phe-
nomenology can allow you to do. One can be 
happy about the idea of such an abstraction 
but, first, it seems difficult to consider this 
while remaining neutral on the realism issue 
and, secondly, it leads to a further difficulty 
(more on this in the next section). 
In examining this further difficulty, we 
should consider the impact of the previous 
point on Kriegel’s general aim. Kriegel wants to 
sort out the structure of phenomenology in 
terms of properties as universals. Given the 
general procedures he adopts, such a structure 
is the result of the similarity judgements given 
by conscious beings. It is we, the conscious be-
ings, that may determine, to use his example, 
whether “phenomenal-yellow17-ness is more 
natural than weekday-phenomenal-yellow17-
ness”, and therefore whether arguments re-
garding the naturalness of the first (endorsed 
by the realists) are to be preferred to arguments 
related to the usefulness of the second (en-
dorsed by the anti-realists). Now, establishing 
a preference for either of these arguments en-
tails establishing which sui generis phenome-
nal types populate the second-layer, or even 
if there is the first unique layer of phenome-
nology per se.  
Consequently, if phenomenology is a mat-
ter of convenience, usefulness or some other 
pragmatic considerations, then the very first 
layer could be something like phenomenology 
for x, where x could be suitably replaced by a 
population, a population in some historical 
moment, or what not. But even accepting 
phenomenology per se as the common ances-
tor, the situation repeats itself at the second 
layer. In this case, for instance, we may estab-
lish that algedonic phenomenology is to be 
merged with conative phenomenology, if one 
takes into account recent arguments in favor 
of a view of pain as a form of imperative, for 
instance, the one put forward by Colin Klein.7  
The arguments marshaled by Klein sup-
port that view that pains, pretty much like 
thirst, hunger and the like, are standing 
commands given to the body. Pain, in partic-
ular, is the command to remove the body, or 
a part of it, from certain conditions or situa-
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tions. The fact that pain determines suffer-
ing, continues Klein, «is not a feature of 
pain: it is a response to pain. This means that 
suffering is only contingently connected to 
pain, and hence that pains only contingently 
hurt and feel bad».8  
Consequently, the phenomenology of pain 
is not essential and primitive to it. Rather, what 
is essential to pain is its command role, the one 
it exercises on the body, eventually protecting 
it. Accepting such a view entails, in the light of 
Kriegel’s proposed structure of phenomenal 
reality, equating algedonic phenomenology to 
some form of conative phenomenology, thus 
reducing the number of phenomenal types be-
longing to the second layer to five instead of 
six, and moving from a categorical to a disposi-
tional view of phenomenal properties. Clearly, 
there may be arguments in support of splitting 
some of the phenomenal universals belonging 
to perceptual phenomenology, if the interests 
and the pragmatic purposes are different, thus 
arriving at six again, but this splitting could 
even result in seven or eight universals if this 
comes in handy. 
 
█  Introspection 
 
Having set the metaphysical framework in 
which judgements on phenomenal encounters 
have to be placed, it is time to consider how 
these encounters happen and to evaluate the 
role of similarity and dissimilarity in intro-
spection. At bottom two claims determine 
what Kriegel calls “introspective minimalism”, 
the view that introspection has a minimal but 
reliable epistemic value. These are above-
chance reliability and non-negligible potency: 
 
[ACR] If subject S introspects having phe-
nomenology P, then S is more likely to 
have P than if S does not so introspect 
 
[NNP] If subject S has phenomenology P, 
then S is more likely to introspect having 
P than if S does not have P.9 
 
Basically, contrasting these principles by 
means of a perceptual example, Kriegel in-
sists with regard to the first, that if you smell 
raspberries it is more probable that there are 
raspberries around and, with regard to the 
second, if there are raspberries around then it 
is probable you will smell them.10 As one can 
appreciate, the perceptual model is deeply in 
the realism tradition, and it assumes that 
phenomenology and its introspection are dis-
tinct entities of our consciousness. So, this 
means that if you have a, so to speak, “cold of 
consciousness”, you can fail to introspect a 
phenomenology you have, as happens if you 
fail to smell the raspberries you have in your 
hands. But is this possible? In what sense can 
you encounter a phenomenology if you can-
not access it?  
The fact is that introspecting seems the 
only way to access our phenomenological en-
counters. So, it is not clear how there can be 
phenomenological features if no one can in-
trospect them. A clue to an answer comes 
from some sort of inferences Kriegel consid-
ers to be involved in our introspective activi-
ty, considered as a method.  
The analysis starts by pointing out that 
there could be cases of introspective disagree-
ments, that is differences between subjects con-
cerning the nature of an experience. Such disa-
greements are in my view possible, even with-
out committing oneself to the distinction be-
tween introspection and phenomenology. But 
the problem remains: could we make sense of 
them without assuming the robustness of intro-
spection from the very beginning. How so? 
Kriegel argues that some may reject the 
very idea of introspective disagreement be-
cause there would be no fact of the matter to 
settle this issue. But Kriegel is right in dis-
missing this view as an overreaction. A fur-
ther view is that of phenomenal variability.11 
Individuals may differ in sensitivity, and this 
difference surfaces in their ability to intro-
spect their own phenomenology. This view is 
ok in many cases, but cannot sustain the bur-
den of adjudicating the phenomenal deter-
minables belonging to the second layer. In 
this case, Kriegel insists that we should admit 
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the possibility that one of the parties of the 
disagreement is wrong.  
The mistake, Kriegel continues, could be 
due to different introspective competence. He 
recognizes that we might exhibit different 
levels of expertise in our capacity to judge 
and evaluate our phenomenal encounters. 
Clearly, such criteria are difficult to apply in 
practice, so he looks for further supplemental 
arguments to defend introspection.  
A very interesting case is the deductive-
bypass approach. The idea is to use intro-
spective statements as premises for deductive 
reasoning. Kriegel refers to Moore and 
Strawson’s arguments in which two people, 
of which only one knows French, are phe-
nomenally compared. It seems that (i) their 
overall phenomenology is different while (ii) 
their pure sensory (phonetic?) phenomenol-
ogy is the same. Hence, (iii) there must be 
some non-sensory phenomenology. Kriegel 
thinks that this is a good argument, even if 
not the best one, to defend and manage in-
trospective disagreement, and that the prob-
lem with the argument is that it cannot work 
without any introspective premise: you can-
not derive a phenomenological conclusion 
without some phenomenological premise.  
However, I think there is a further prob-
lem with this argument. I used this argument, 
unaware of the Moore and Strawson ver-
sions, while discussing Searle’s Chinese room 
argument.12  
I argued that, for instance, semantic 
knowledge of French as a second language is 
the passage from morpho-syntactic perfor-
mance (saying “[vwa:tyʀ]”) to semantic 
competence (knowing one is saying “voi-
ture”, namely car). This passage, though, is 
possible only if one accepts the idea that 
there is something like a purely sensory phe-
nomenology to be contrasted with an overall 
phenomenology, one which, presumably, 
sums the sensory with the non-sensory phe-
nomenology. But here the argument is mar-
shalled in order to individuate the second-
layer phenomenal primitives, and the exist-
ence of this distinction belongs, if I get 
Kriegel’s grand picture right, just to this level. 
Hence, this argument begs the question of 
the fundamental phenomenal primitives be-
cause it uses this difference in the premises.  
So, Kriegel refers to a non-deductive ar-
gument to get to a phenomenological conclu-
sion via an inference to the best explanation. 
Here he adopts an argument by Pitt and 
Goldman, nicely reconstructed, which goes 
as follows: 
 
P1)  Subject S has immediate non-inferential 
knowledge of some cognitive state S is in; 
 
P2)  If some of S’s cognitive states have an ir-
reducible phenomenology, this would best 
explain S’s immediate, non-inferential 
knowledge of them; therefore (by infer-
ence to the best explanation); 
 
C1)  Some of S’s cognitive states have an irre-
ducible phenomenology; and therefore 
 
C2)  There is such a thing as irreducible phe-
nomenology.13 
 
So, introspection disagreement could be 
inferred via divergence in non-inferential 
knowledge between two subjects by assum-
ing, as the best explanation available, that 
they have a different phenomenal encounter. 
He defends the importance of adopting in-
trospection as an epistemic resource to gain 
knowledge on phenomenal experience by 
pointing out that cognitive science, supposedly 
remote to the use of introspection, is either in-
sufficient as a science of the mind, when it 
comes to facing phenomenal consciousness, or 
is far from being free of introspective acts. To 
argue in favor of this second disjunct Kriegel 
describes the famous debate on mental image-
ry, initiated by Roger Shepard and then force-
fully pursued by Stephen Kosslyn.14  
In the experiments on mental imagery, 
subjects were asked to check whether two 
images of complex shapes depicted the same 
object rotated a number of degrees or a spec-
ular copy of the object. Shepard found that if 
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the two shapes were rotated about 53 de-
grees, then the response arrived after a sec-
ond. He made the hypothesis that the rota-
tional speed of what Kosslyn called the “visu-
al buffer”, was 53° per second. Introspection 
is thus indirectly vindicated in terms of infer-
ence to the best explanation.  
However, I doubt that Kriegel is fair with 
respect to the way in which cognitive science 
has tackled the problem. In fact, Kosslyn has 
shown that the ability to estimate the speed 
of rotation, basically common to all human 
beings, is a feature of the visual buffer, not 
one of our introspective abilities. If it were 
dependent on introspection, there would be 
differences between people, since it is diffi-
cult to imagine that our introspective abili-
ties are all on a par. Rather, we rely on intro-
spection once the visual buffer has done its 
job and the result (same shape or mirror 
shape?) pops out in our mind. It seems to me, 
then, that the case for the reliability of intro-
spection is still waiting to be made. 
 
█  Cognitive phenomenology 
 
The second layer of the determinable / de-
terminate relation comprises cognitive phe-
nomenology. According to Kriegel, cognition, 
in particular belief, has a phenomenology of 
its own. This phenomenology is fundamental-
ly characterized by presenting the content of 
beliefs as true. So, if one believes that p, the 
phenomenal attitude is one of presenting p as 
true, and this determines the functional roles 
typical of believing something true. So, con-
trary to what functional role semantics has 
held, we do not believe something to be true 
because its functional role is such-and-such, 
but the functional role is the one we observe 
because we believe it is true, that is, we have 
the attitude of presenting it as true.  
In order to ground this attitude, Kriegel 
refers to the idea that such attitudes are cate-
gorical properties, as opposed to disposition-
al properties. But this is not enough; in fact, 
also perceptual phenomenology can be thus 
characterized. The further distinguishing 
feature, then, is that cognitive phenomenolo-
gy is non sensory. This feature distinguishes 
cognitive phenomenology from phenome-
nology per se. So, how can phenomenology 
per se be described? 
Phenomenology per se is defined by recur-
ring to the idea of an explanatory gap. The ex-
pression “explanatory gap”, originally from 
Levine, identifies the fact that a complete phys-
ical explanation of any phenomenal episode is 
doomed to some sort of incompleteness, one 
that leaves out what seems to be the very gist of 
the experience itself. So, an explanation of what 
happens to me when I have a sip of nice wine, 
will enlist the activation of my receptors and 
brain areas, leaving out the kind of pleasure I 
have while the wine was stimulating my recep-
tors and phenomenally invading my attention.  
In order to obtain phenomenological re-
duction, the explanatory gap is analyzed in 
terms of failure of deducibility, which is the 
inability to deduce phenomenal facts from 
facts concerning structure and function, 
these two being the facts that presumably ex-
plain the workings of the brain. So, we end 
up by taking phenomenality to be a categori-
cal property that determines a rationally war-
ranted appearance of an explanatory gap 
with respect to physical properties.15 
Generalizing from this, in defining what is 
primitive cognitive phenomenology, Kriegel 
builds up the following argument: (i) there 
are inner episodes that present some content 
as true; (ii) such episodes have a warranted 
appearance of an explanatory gap (thus qual-
ifying as phenomenal); (iii) such episodes are 
irreducible to any other kind of phenome-
nology (sensory, algedonic, conative, etc.); 
therefore, (iv) there is an irreducible cogni-
tive phenomenology.16 
The challenging premise, to my eyes, is 
the second one. The whole argument is de-
fended by a thought experiment starring Zoe, 
a fully functional but phenomenally deprived 
person, that suffers from some radical imagi-
nary form of non-x/x-ing where x stands for 
any sensory modality (so, she is “blindsight”, 
“deafhearing”, and so on). How are we to 
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make sense of Zoe?  
It is natural to turn to Ned Block’s dis-
tinction between two varieties of conscious-
ness, access consciousness and phenomenal 
consciousness. The first is described like this: 
 
P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious 
properties are experiential properties. The 
totality of experiential properties of a state 
are “what it is like” to have it […] P-
conscious properties include all the experi-
ential properties of sensations, feelings, and 
perceptions, but I would also include 
thoughts, wants and emotions.17  
 
A-consciousness, vice versa, is:  
 
A is access consciousness. A state is A-
conscious if is directly poised for control of 
thought and action. To add more detail, a 
representation is A-conscious if it is poised 
for free use in reasoning and for direct “ra-
tional” control in action and speech (the 
“rational” is meant to rule out the kind of 
control that obtains in blindsight).18  
 
Block’s remark in parentheses is used to 
stress that actual blindsight patients do not 
have A-consciousness because, for example, a 
thirsty subject can recognize her state of wa-
ter deprivation but is not able to use the in-
formation that there is a bottle in her visual 
field, supposing there is one, to quench it.  
Zoe, however, is described as a person who 
is able to solve mathematical problems but de-
rives no felt joy from solving these. Zoe, then, 
resembles the superblindsighted person imag-
ined by Block, one that can force herself to 
guess what is in her blind field. It seems to me 
that Zoe can be imagined like this in coherence 
with the description given by Kriegel.  
The point of the argument is that the in-
ner experiences of Zoe are such as to present 
a specific cognitive phenomenology but no 
sensory phenomenology, thus showing the 
irreducibility of the former to the latter. It is 
my contention that if Zoe has some primitive 
phenomenology, then a computer appropri-
ately programmed has it as well. Zoe’s con-
sciousness lies in the vividness with which 
she imagines the mathematical solutions or 
the different steps of her proofs. But why 
can’t we “functionalize” such vividness?  
Consider chess programs: these rank 
moves preferences by virtue of their values in 
the short and medium time strategies they de-
termine. Ranking and preferences can be ex-
plained without generating any gap, but by 
assigning numerical values. By removing all 
the sensory components of Zoe’s inner life, 
Kriegel has removed too many things, he has 
removed the consciousness he is looking for. 
Zoe is some sort of super-blindsighted person, 
one that a computer program, or a robot for 
that matter, can be as well. Zoe incarnates the 
form of access-consciousness that the super-
blindsighted person imagined by Block has, 
that is, a state with a content that is part of in-
ferences and may determine action. But this 
kind of state is the kind of explicit content 
that computer programs, either controlling 
robots or those which just simulate actions, 
are supposed to provide to justify their con-
clusions or the actions performed. So, if the 
Zoe argument is effective, it not only shows 
that there is a sui generis and irreducible primi-
tive form of cognitive consciousness, but it 
shows that there is no explanatory gap left. 
An indirect way to show that the explana-
tory gap is no longer there, is by considering 
the lists of platitudes that are provided in the 
attempt to formulate Ramsey sentences that 
have to pinpoint the various phenomenal 
states composing the second layer of the 
cognitive phenomenology.  
First of all, the way in which these phe-
nomenal states are individuated is by re-
describing their logical nature. So, for in-
stance, “doubting that p” is taken to be fully 
analyzable in terms of the “inability to judge 
whether p”. But if this is the proper analysis, 
why is that creating any explanatory gap?  
As such, a robot can doubt whether p be-
cause the weights to the various alternatives 
are not strong enough to constitute a reason 
for one choice over the other. So, if doubting 
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that p is the inability to judge whether p, then 
p can be perfectly attained without imagining 
that something has been left out, as the ex-
planatory gap suggests. 
Secondly, I wonder whether such analyses 
are on the same phenomenal level of their anal-
ysans; alternatively said, do these represent un-
intended proto-reductive analyses of cognitive 
phenomenology? Consider again the “inability 
to judge whether p”: where is the phenomenal 
part of this analysis? Is it in the “inability to” or 
is it in the “inability to judge”?  
If the former, then it may recur in other 
primitive phenomenologies, for there could be 
cases of “inability to” also in perception, as the 
inability to distinguish between two shades of 
color. But this inability would not constitute a 
primitive phenomenal quality only for cogni-
tion. If the primitive component is the “judg-
ing”, then how are we to understand the phe-
nomenology of judging, that sometimes recurs 
as explanandum (platitude 6) and sometimes 
as explanans (platitude 10)?  
The point is that if some cognitive phe-
nomenal state is analyzed by other attitudes 
that enter, in turn, into other cognitive phe-
nomenal states, then, if my case against Zoe’s 
argument is solid, cognitive phenomenology, as 
a whole, admits a non-phenomenal reading. 
In The Varieties of Consciousness, Uriah 
Kriegel has done an important job in pinning 
down the various aspects of phenomenology 
that are frequently left to our intuition to ex-
plore without a clear guide to help us. Kriegel 
provides such a guide, and I’m still in doubt 
whether the blind and dark spots that I have 
tried to point out are limits of the guide or 
features of the path. 
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